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1. Introduction 
On August 17, 1945, in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the Dutch was confronted with the independence 
declaration by Sukarno and Hatta. 
 
 
Figure 1: Sukarno declares the independence  
of Indonesia on the 17th of August 19451. 
 
In September 1945, the British landed on Java and Sumatra 
to disarm the Japanese forces and to reinforce the Dutch 
governance in the colony. In independent Indonesia 
revolutionary forces stood up and wanted to defend their 
recently gained independence. After a battle by Surabaya 
(Java) between the British and the Indonesian revolutionary 
forces the British decided to accept the existence of the 
Republik Indonesia and to cooperate with its government 
[1,2,3,4,5]. 
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1 http://gratisia.co.cc/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/proklamasi_indonesia.jpg 
 
The Dutch government decided to form an army to restore 
order and peace in Nederlandsch Indië.  Since autumn 1944, 
when the south of the Netherlands was liberated from the 
Germans, soldiers were recruited to free Nederlandsch Indië  
from the Japanese and to restore order, and to impose 
another progressive form of decolonization [1,3,5,6,7].   
 
When the Dutch soldiers arrived in Indonesia, a political 
solution seemed to be close. Under British pressure and 
mediating, an agreement (the agreement of Linggadjati) was 
signed between delegations of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands for a gradual independence 
of Indonesia [1,8].   
 
After a disagreement with the Dutch government about the 
implications of the agreement, it was terminated in July 
1947. This resulted in a war. In the terminology of the 
Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL)  these were 
politional actions. [6,7,8].   
 
 
Figure 2: Signing of the agreement of Linggadjati,  
on the photo Sutan Sjahrir (left) and W. Schermerhorn.2 
                                                          
2 http://www.geschiedenis.nl/art/uploads/image/st/scherm1.JPG 
Currently the excesses of the colonial war between The Netherlands and Indonesia in the former Dutch 
Indies are being re-evaluated and interpreted in The Netherlands. More and more reports, photos and 
confessions appear showing a different truth than the one that is generally accepted in The Netherlands.  
Marx said that people make history, but never in conditions of their own making. This essay evaluates the 
perspective of cultural studies in a historical context.  
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Units of the royal navy and the Dutch Royal land forces, 
together with thousands of volunteers and ten thousand of 
conscripts of the Dutch started fighting against the army of 
the Republic Indonesia and other operating Indonesian 
forces.  
 
The actions led to a guerrilla war wherein Indonesian forces 
were helped by the sympathizing civilians to create a 
situation that made it difficult to impossible to control the 
area by the Dutch army. This situation caused war excesses 
on both sides [1,6].   
 
Dutch soldiers were already mentioning the guerrilla war in 
the letters that they send to their family and friends in the 
Netherlands, which led to the first debates in the Dutch 
parliament about war excesses in Indonesia [1,3]. In 1949, 
the Dutch military leadership started to recognize that this 
guerrilla war was impossible to win. On December 27, 1949, 
the sovereignty declaration was signed and Indonesia 
became independent (see figure 3).  
 
One of the parts of the sovereignty declaration was that there 
would be a mutual amnesty for all of those who committed 
war crimes [1,3,4].   
 
 
Figure 3: Signing of the sovereignty declaration.3 
 
2. Research 
After the return of the soldiers from Indonesia, almost 
nobody spoke about the war crimes committed by the Dutch 
in Indonesia until January 17, 1969. Psychologist and 
physiologist Dr. J.E. Hueting gave an interview in an opinion 
programme on television about torture of Indonesian citizens, 
murders of war prisoners and committed violence against the 
civilian population. Hueting was a conscript soldier send to 
Indonesia in 1947 [1,6,9,10,11].  
 
This interview created a shock wave in the public opinion. 
Hueting was accused of lies by former comrades; other 
comrades confirmed his stories [1,12].   
 
On the occasion of the interview with Hueting questions 
were asked in the Dutch Lower House by the leader of the 
opposition: J.M. den Uyl [14].  He asked for an overview of 
the government known facts of war crimes [1,6,14].   
 
On January 21, 1969, the chairman of the Dutch Lower 
House send an letter to the Prime Minister de Jong of the 
Netherlands wherein he requested to present a nota to the 
                                                          
3 http://deoorlog.nps.nl/upload/overdracht.jpg 
Lower House with all the known facts about possible 
misdeeds of Dutch soldiers in Indonesia [1,6,14].   
 
On January 29, 1969, Prime Minister de Jong answered 
positively and stated that misdeeds done by Dutch soldiers 
before the sovereignty transfer should be made clear as much 
as possible [1,2].   
 
The research was entrusted to a steering group of secretary-
generals of the ministries of general affairs, defence, justice, 
foreign affairs, education and science and internal affairs. 
The President was Mr. A.J.M. van Nispen tot Pannerden, 
secretary-general of the ministry internal affairs. This 
steering group used the findings of an interdepartmental 
commission: the Coordinatiegroep Indonesië 1945-1950.  
President of this group was Mr. E.J. Korthals Altes; its 
secretary was a jurist and historian C. Fasseur [1,2].   
 
In addition, the government asked Mr. N.S. Blom, former 
director of Justice in the Dutch Indies and former Secretary 
General of Foreign Affairs, to write a report about 
responsibilities and authority relationships. What orders did 
the military commanders gave, what was the view and 
attitude of the Dutch Indies government, what is reported to 
the government in The Hague, what were the indications of 
the government in The Hague to Batavia, and which orders 
were received by lower commanders was the thought behind 
this research [1,14].   
 
The research was based on 49 official and private archives 
with an estimated length of 1814 meter. It was based on the 
departmental archives, court martial records, from private 
collections coming (in the State Archives) registered papers, 
press documentation, the archives of the board of mission of 
the Dutch Reformed Church, and information by individuals, 
in particular Dr. J.E. Hueting and Ds. H.A.C. Hildering.   The 
archives of the military auditions could not be used, as Dutch 
officials destroyed them before they left Indonesia.  
 
Restricted collections with an individual embargo were 
considered not relevant for this research [1].   
 
3. The Excessen Nota 
For cases that proved to be important, a list was compiled. 
The list was divided in two groups: violence and looting. 
This list counted 500 á 600 cases. The other 10.000 
investigated cases concern violations against discipline, 
traffic offenses, commune property offenses, so matters that 
are entirely outside the examination of the research. Save for 
a few exceptions the violence cases, 141 in total, were worse 
than the looting cases. On many occasions, which were 
leading to a verdict, the looting cases were, for example, 
taking an object with a small value, a piece of clothing or a 
small amount of money. Therefore, the cases of looting are 
not published in the excessen nota [1, 15].   
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Doorn and Hendrix, state in their book Het Nederlands / 
Indonesisch conflict, ontsporing van geweld that a total of 
110 cases are listed for assault, murder, manslaughter and 
severe or mild abuse. They exclude here on 19 sex crimes, 11 
cases of robbery and 5 cases where its motives are unclear, 
and then they kept about 75 cases, apparently relating to the 
military function. Here are 54 cases of murder or 
manslaughter. Over this we isolate 9 cases with mixed or 
personal reasons, and then we have 45 cases (60%) of 
homicide, with evidence showing the existence of police 
actions [16]. 
. 
There are six cases of deaths of prisoners due to a hearing. 
There are 12 cases of slain, and 3 cases of incitement of the 
slain, in all cases the violators were those who exercise direct 
power over their victims. In 8 cases prisoners were killed 
during monitoring. There are 9 cases where jurisdiction is 
unclear. Finally, there are 10 cases of deaths of civilians 
caused by 'trigger speed' or other weapon use.  
 
In the case of abuse they conclude that 11 cases of abuse took 
place during interrogations, while in 7 cases suspected to 
occur are made. In 1 of the 7 cases we speak of abuse of 
power [16]. 
 
The disclosure of the results of the research was questioned 
by the government. On one hand, a disclosure could give 
exposure for the positive actions of the Dutch forces and it 
will give a complete picture of the political relationships and 
responsibilities. The government preferred this, but the 
government also realised that this would cost years of 
meticulous historical research. The government decided that 
in the shortest period possible as much as closure should be 
given about possible war crimes [1]. 
 
4. Results 
The research team presented the result of their research on 
June 2, 1969 to the Dutch Lower House. Their nota came 
with 15 appendices, a newspaper research done by the 
Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst4 and a reprint of a chronological 
overview of the development of the Indonesian issue in 
national and international political relationships in 1948 and 
1949 [1].  After the excessennota was presented, it received 
three main points of critics: 
- Dubiety about the completeness 
- Discussion about the system of the  
  violation excesses 
-  Applying of the concept war crimes 
 
The gouvernement of Minister President de Jong made a 
statement about the incompleteness: ‘uiteraard is het 
feitenmateriaal waarover thans nog kan worden beschikt 
onvolledig, doch een voldoende indruk over de aard en 
                                                          
4 Government Information Service 
omvang van de excessen kan er wel uit worden verkregen5’ 
[1].   
 
After the presentation of the excessen nota the Dutch 
government acknowledged that the Dutch military forces had 
surrendered themselves to violent excesses, but that those 
excesses should be understood in a situation of unregulated 
guerrilla, in which Indonesian ambushes and terror provoked 
acts of contra terror. The actions of the Dutch were 
sometimes degenerated, but there was no systematic 
campaign of violation excesses [1].   
 
5. Terminology 
In the discussion after January 1969, different words were 
used to the behavior of the Dutch soldiers in the former 
Dutch Indies [1,13]. 
 
The confusion started already when the research was about to 
be started; what should be researched? The response of the 
Dutch Lower House was that the researchers should think in 
the broadest sense of the words misdeeds and excesses [1]. 
 
Hueting used the word oorlogsmisdaden, war crimes. The 
Prime Minister spoke about excessen, excesses, while the 
Chairman of the Lower House spoke about wandaden, 
misdeeds. L de Jong, a well-known historian and author of 
the series Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog spoke about oorlogsmisdrijven, which in 
English has the same meaning as war crimes [1,14]. 
 
Prime Minister de Jong choose not to use the term war 
crimes in the end version of the excessennota.   He stated 
that the term war crimes were related to the systematic and 
over a broad front convicted war crimes by Germany and 
Japan and that it had a huge emotional load. If the term was 
used, de Jong stated, it will immediately raise the question 
whether those who convicted the war crimes were yet 
punished.  
 
He chooses the word excess, because from his point of view, 
the war crimes were an exception to the rule of proper 
behaviour [1,14,17]. 
 
 
6. Rawagede 
On December 9, 1947, the Dutch forces established a 
massacre in Rawagede. Due to a recent claim for 
compensation from the villagers of Rawagede to the Dutch 
government, the Dutch media regularly pick up this case.    
 
In the excessennota the case of Rawagede is just one of the 
cases. In appendices 5 it is stated that: 
December 9, 1947 
                                                          
5 "Of course, the evidence which is currently available may be incomplete, but an 
adequate impression of the nature and extent of the excesses may well be derived from 
it ' 
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Rawagede (regency Krawang, West Java)  
Without any process executing 20 by the Dutch detained 
Indonesians. 
 
Two archives are used to investigate this excess:  
- Archive of the ministry of Foreign Affairs  
- Archive Attorney General 
 
After a complaint of the Republican state observers of the 
Commissie van Goede Diensten of the U.N. committed an 
on-site investigation. They came with a report on January 12, 
1947 to the conclusion that in the area of Rawagede an 
underground movement was being established, with 
Rawagede as a center. The oriented action against Rawagede 
by the Dutch forces was called deliberate and ruthless in a 
report. 
 
At first sight the Dutch denied the massacre, but during the 
investigation, it was admitted that some prisoners were 
executed without any interrogation or process. During and 
after the actions no weapons were found in the kampong. 
According to the Dutch there were 150 Indonesian casualties. 
On the Dutch side there were no casualties.  
 
The Major, who had led the operation and enforcement of the 
execution, a total of twenty, was after consultations between 
the Army Commander and the Attorney General, not 
persecuted for reasons of expediency [1]. 
 
7. Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda 
Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda was founded on May 5, 
2005. K.U.K.B. exists in Indonesia and the Netherlands. On 
April 4, 2007, the committee became a foundation in the 
Netherlands. The foundation is non-subsidized and 
independent.  K.U.K.B. represented the interests of the 
(Indonesian) civilian casualties under the Dutch colonial 
period, which have suffered the violence of war crimes 
committed by the Dutch military.  
 
A recognition and apology from the Dutch government to the 
Indonesian victims, recognition of the war damage, looting, 
restitution and the suffering that the people of Indonesia have 
undergone is the target of the foundation. 
 
The case of Rawagede has, as single massacre, a special 
section the website of K.U.K.B.  In an article on their website 
facts are stated that can be compared with the facts in the 
excessennota.  
 
The findings are mainly based on a former secret folder, 
named folder 1304, which can be found in National Dutch 
Archives. This folder was composed of the research for the 
excessennota in 1969. The massacre was perpetrated by 
conscripted foot soldiers. That was remarkable, because 
many other war crimes were the work of hardened 
professional soldiers of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army 
(KNIL) and the special units. The divisions of conscripts 
were named Tentara Susu, "the soft army”. They were 
friendly to the Indonesian people and more critical in relation 
to the colonial policy than other troops. 
 
In the war diary of the unit, found in folder 1304, that cleared 
Rawagede the action is mentioned briefly. The company used 
a cleansing operation against Rawahgede.  
 
On the enemy side were 150 deaths counted. 8 persons were 
imprisoned. It is said that the compound was found to be 
completely Republican, which turned out to red-white flags 
with which several houses were decorated and documents 
and articles found on the slain opponents.  
 
A memorandum, found in folder 1304, prepared by an 
employee of the Attorney General to the Supreme Court in 
Batavia stated that the mission of the company was 'Ruim 
weerstand Rawagede op’.  It describes how the Dutch 8 or 9 
times executed twelve men and just beyond the village 
another 7 to 10 persons. It is therefore 100 to 120 liquidations 
instead of 20 liquidations mentioned in the excessennota.  
 
Is there a cover-up? K.U.B.K claims that, based on their 
research in folder 1304, the hedge immediately began. They 
claim that the message in the war diary of the unit was 
written long after the killings, and that it was most likely 
misleading.  
 
A found document describes that the major who led the 
company was ordered from his commander to remain silent. 
He had to deny everything at an inquiry by the United 
Nations. The Netherlands denied the high death toll claimed 
by the Indonesians (more than 430 men) and stuck to his own 
150 deaths.  
 
That would have fallen by shootings, was the suggestion. The 
Netherlands finally admitted that there were four prisoners of 
war executed. The liquidation of another seven was denied. 
The UN report from 1948, calls the action nevertheless 
"deliberate and ruthless' as is also mentioned in the 
excessennota.  
 
Harm Scholtens, the writer of a doctoral thesis at the 
University of Groningen about Rawagede claims that the 
number of 20 liquidations seems to be invented and that he 
does not know where this number comes from. His research 
emerges a picture of a cold mass extermination. Probably the 
unit was surprised by the finding of more than 100 men who 
they suspected that they were fighters who had thrown away 
their weapons.  
 
To take the men with them was too dangerous: they were 
more numerous than the Dutch and ambushes threatened 
them everywhere. Let them go possibly meant that they soon 
would be back, armed and well. Liquidation seemed to be the 
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best option, the unit may have thought. This happened often, 
but it is not known at this scale [18]. 
 
The K.U.B.K. also claims, based on research on folder 1304, 
that there has been a correspondence between Army 
Commander Spoor, who was responsible for the prosecution 
of soldiers, and Attorney General Felderhof.  
 
Spoor doubts in this letter whether he should prosecute the 
responsible major or not. Felderhof recommends to Spoor to 
dismiss the matter as "any foreign interference and interest is 
gone." The UN after writing their report, in which is spoken 
of only 4 executions no longer interested in the massacre. 
 
Finally, the K.U.B.K. states on her website that more 
evidence of a cover-up is, that the document on executions is 
based on an entire file on Rawagede that was sent by Army 
Commander Spoor to Attorney General Felderhof. That file 
is gone. Harm Scholtens searched many archives, indexes, 
even in the personal archives of the Army Commander 
Spoor. The K.U.B.K. Asks herself on its website: Is the 
(short) paper on the executions in folder 1304 overlooked in 
the destruction of evidence? 
 
8. Recent Developments 
In 1995 a documentary was broadcasted about Rawagede. 
The documentary makers spoke with survivors and relatives 
in the village of Rawagede. Especially the testimony of an 
old woman went through the bone. In a trembling voice she 
tells how she found her husband and son among the corpses 
and took them back. According to the documentary makers 
431 men, from young to old, summarily were executed.  
 
There were questions in the Dutch Lower House by Blaauw 
(VVD), Hillen (CDA), Dijksma (PvdA) en Roethof (D66), 
because what about those 20 liquidations in the 
excessennota? Was that the truth? At the request of the 
Minister of Justice Winnie Sorgdrager the prosecutor in 
Arnhem did a preliminary investigation.  
 
According to the prosecution there were simply different 
interpretations of the events in Rawagede. Moreover, the 
perpetrators are not to be prosecuted, said the minister. War 
crimes do not expire, but the parliament made an exception 
for the Dutch troops in Indonesia between 1945 and 1950 
[19].  
 
As said before the case of Rawagede is covered in several 
articles in the media recently. Most articles bring the story of 
the massacre, which is similar to the history as covered by 
foundation K.U.K.B.  The reason for the renewed attention 
for Rawagede is the claim from the survivors for recognition, 
an apology and financial compensation from the Dutch state.   
The plaintiffs are seven widows, among them the daughter of 
one victim and the foundation K.U.K.B. who is protecting 
their interests.  
The tenth plaintiff, Sakam Bin Saih, was still a young man at 
the time of the massacre. He hid for the Dutch soldiers, but 
was found and transported and, with other men, lined up and 
shot from behind. Sakam were seriously injured, his father 
and brother were killed. 
 
The lawyer representing the relatives, Mr. Liesbeth Zegveld, 
says that the claim is not only about compensation. They 
want above all that the Netherlands will take responsibility 
for their suffering.  
 
On November 24, 2008 it came clear that the Dutch 
government is not willing to pay compensation to the 
plaintiffs. According to the Dutch state advocate the issue is 
barred. This appears from a letter from the state advocate to 
the lawyers of nine survivors and a survivor.  
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Bot and the Dutch 
ambassador van Dam expressed deep regret on behalf of the 
government about the painful and violent way in Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence.  
 
Het Parool stated on September 8, 2008, that because both 
the Indonesian and Dutch government argued that a 
discussion of compensation is not an issue.  It was arranged 
earlier in 1966 in the Financial Agreement. This was the 
settlement of disputes over the separation of the Netherlands 
and Indonesia [20].  
 
Finally, on December 5, 2011 the Dutch government decided 
to give formal excuses and a compensation of 20.000 euro 
per person to the victims of Rawagede [21]. 
 
 
Figure 4: Rawagede.6 
 
9. The Perception of Cultural Studies 
The interpretation of historical facts in wartime is 
ambiguous. There are definitely two sides of a story, such as 
in the above described case of Rawagede.  Survivors of war 
crimes in the former Dutch Indies want recognition, apology 
and financial compensation, as war crimes never expire.  
 
Marx said that people make history, but never in conditions 
of their own making. He meant that the ability to create new 
stories, and with that to remake the world is always 
constrained and enabled by the specific political, economic, 
historic circumstances in which we were born [22].  
 
Grossberg says that the beginnings of the stories we tell are 
                                                          
6 https://history1978.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/rawagede.jpg 
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always the endings of other stories that we have not bothered 
to tell. We always enter the conservation in mid-sentence 
[22]. 
 
Jrank.org says ‘if people make history—but within 
conditions not of their own devising—cultural studies 
explores the ways this process is enacted with and through 
cultural practices, and studies the place of such practices 
within specific historical formations. Cultural studies 
explore the historical possibilities of transforming people's 
lives by trying to understand the relationships of power 
within which individual realities are constructed. That is, it 
seeks to understand not only the organizations of power, but 
also the possibilities of survival, struggle, resistance, and 
change. It takes contestation for granted, not as a reality in 
every instance, but as an assumption necessary for the 
existence of critical work, political opposition, and even 
historical change’ [23]. 
 
Micheal Pickering argues that historical science and cultural 
studies should complement each other and that engaging 
with history should be a key aspect of doing cultural studies, 
and vice versa [24]. 
 
The case of Rawagede describes the historical possibilities 
that transformed people’s lives. Due to a very small male 
population in the village the villagers remained poor till 
recent days. Of course the horror of the war crimes in the 
village has left its trails. The relationships of power are 
changing, which makes this case very interesting in the 
perspective of cultural studies.  
 
The realm of power changed after the Dutch government 
finally agreed to pay war reparations and with that possibly 
made a precedent to other villages or persons affected by war 
crimes in Indonesia. We can conclude from what’s written 
above that the excessennota is far from complete and that 
unexpected claims might come up. The case of Rawagede 
might change history and raise awareness in The Netherlands 
as well in Indonesia for a history rewritten.  
 
It is needed that, while eyewitnesses are still alive, further 
research is done the soonest, so history can be altered and 
can be done justice.  
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